In early February 1973 the Uruguayan armed forces openly defied President Juan Maria Bordaberry, forcing him within days to accept a pact that gave the military a permanent tutelary role over the civilian government, a quasi-coup that was the decisive step toward the full self-coup of June. The crisis broke when Bordaberry, trying to reassert authority over increasingly assertive commanders, replaced the defense minister on February 8 with a retired general, Antonio Francese. The army and air force commanders rejected the appointment; on the evening of February 9 they announced on state television that they would disavow any orders from Francese and demanded his removal, and on February 9 and 10 issued public communiques (No.
4 and No. 7) proposing a sweeping political, social, and economic program. Bordaberry called citizens to rally in his support, but the navy's initial loyalty collapsed and the president was isolated.
On February 12, at the Boiso Lanza air base, Bordaberry capitulated, signing the Boiso Lanza Pact that entrusted the armed forces with a role in national development and created the National Security Council (COSENA) as a military-dominated advisory body.
Researched Details
Researched
Independent research, added record by record. Hover any label for what it means.
Target identified in Coup Atlas research: President Juan Maria Bordaberry, forced by the February 1973 military defiance to accept the Boiso Lanza Pact and military tutelage; he remained in office and was not physically harmed.
RESEARCHED NAME
Key figures
Juan Maria Bordaberry (president forced to accept military tutelage)
Antonio Francese (defense minister the military rejected)
The army and air force commanders (who issued the defiant communiques)
Sources
On February 8, 1973, to control the buildup of military pressure, President Bordaberry replaced the Minister of National Defence Armando Malet with retired general Antonio Francese, and on the following day the new minister found support only in the Navy, while at eight o'clock that evening the commanders of the Army and Air Forces announced from state television that they would disavow any orders by Francese and demanded that Bordaberry sack him.
On Monday February 12 Bordaberry went to the Boiso Lanza air base and accepted all the demands of the military commanders and negotiated his continuation in the presidency, in what became known as the Pacto de Boiso Lanza, which entrusted the Armed Forces with the mission of providing security for national development and resulted in the creation of the National Security Council (COSENA), completing the slide into a civil-military government formally ruled by civilians but in fact centered on the military.
In February 1973 a deep conflict emerged among the president, the General Assembly, and the armed forces when the army and air force rebelled against Bordaberry's selection of a civilian as defense minister, and on February 9 and 10 the army issued two communiques proposing political, social, and economic measures, after which Bordaberry made the Boisso Lanza Pact, which in effect constituted a quasi-coup and created the National Security Council as an advisory body.
SOURCE REVIEWEDCountry Studies, Uruguay: The Military Government 1973-85open source ↗
On February 9 and 10 the Army and Air Force commanders issued public proclamations demanding radical changes in the country's political and economic system, promising to end unemployment, support local industry, eliminate corruption, and implement land reform, and Bordaberry bowed to the pressure on February 12, concluding an agreement that created COSENA consisting of the service commanders and key ministers.
SOURCE REVIEWEDWikipedia, Civic-military dictatorship of Uruguayopen source ↗
Editorial Note
Paired record care: this February record is the military's open defiance and the Boiso Lanza Pact (February 8 to 12, 1973) that imposed military tutelage; the companion record 1973-06-27 is Bordaberry's full self-coup dissolving parliament, and the two are distinct dataset events marking the two stages of Uruguay's descent into the civic-military dictatorship. Coding note: the dataset labels the February event a military coup, and it was a quasi-coup in which the armed forces coerced the elected president into surrendering effective control while leaving him nominally in office; Bordaberry was not physically harmed, matching the dataset fate. Date nuance: the crisis ran February 8 to 12, with the dataset date February 10 falling within the communiques; the Boiso Lanza Pact was signed February 12.
Cross-Reference
Only one dataset carries it. One of the three reference datasets we check against carries this event; the others do not list it. That is not a contradiction — the datasets cover different periods and use different thresholds — but it means the record has had less outside corroboration.
Identifiers for finding this same event in the other datasets:
Coup Atlas research identifies the target as: President Juan Maria Bordaberry, forced by the February 1973 military defiance to accept the Boiso Lanza Pact and military tutelage; he remained in office and was not physically harmed..
Baseline coding: Incumbent executive removed from power. Recorded leader fate: deposed; not physically harmed. The baseline file does not name individual targets; researched names are kept in a separate layer.
Baseline Dataset Citation
Cline Center Coup d’État Project Dataset, v2.2.2
Peyton, Buddy, Joseph Bajjalieh, Michael Martin, and Andrea Gerald. 2026. Cline Center Coup d’État Project Dataset. Cline Center for Advanced Social Research. V.2.2.2. February 17. University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign. doi: 10.13012/B2IDB-9651987_V10
“Uruguayan Crisis Eased By Accord Borda Berry And Military Commanders Agree On Fundamental Points; URUGUAYAN CRISIS EASED BY ACCORD Political Parties Quiet ’The People Will Rebel’ Cabinet an Issue,” February 13, 1973
“Military in Uruguay Ousts President over Policy Differences,“ June 13, 1976
This is the citation trail carried by the baseline dataset, grouped by outlet and rejoined from the line-wrapped original. Coup Atlas has not independently re-checked every document; read the original before citing a specific claim. URLs the import damaged beyond safe repair are shown as plain text and listed in citations-report.md. How this list is built →